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DECONSTRUCTING AYAAN HIRSI ALI 
ON ISLAMISM, NEOCONSERVATISM AND THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS 
 
In The Evidence of Experience, a notable essay by the historian Joan W. Scott, she 
questions the naturalness attributed to subjective experience. Experience as 
personal testimony is commonly conceived as authentic and true, and the 
authority granted to experience powerfully buttresses claims to knowledge. 
Emancipatory projects – whether centered around the identities of workers, 
minorities, feminists, or gays – have often relied on subjective experience to 
question dominant, ‘objective’ paradigms. But the appeal to experience, Scott 
contends, leaves aside ‘questions about the constructed nature of experience, 
about how subjects are constituted as different in the first place, about how one’s 
vision is structured’.1 Therefore the ‘evidence of experience’ can end up 
essentializing identity and reproducing rather than contesting given ideological 
systems.  
In the case of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, arguably those very qualities lend her writing its 
persuasive power and impressive popularity. A series of critical analyses has 
identified Hirsi Ali’s work as an example of the political efficacy of 
autobiographical writing in reinforcing dominant stereotypes through an appeal 
to authenticity and personal experience.2 Kiran Grewal, for instance, has 
                                                        
1 J. Scott, ‘The evidence of experience’, Critical Enquiry, 17:4 (1991), pp. 773-797; 777. 
2 See: S. Mahmood, ‘Religion, Feminism and Empire: The New Ambassadors of Islamophobia’ in 
Joan Wallach Scott (ed) Women’s Studies on the Edge (Durham: Duke, 2008), pp. 81-115; S. 
Sheehi, Islamophobia: The Ideological Campaign against Muslims (Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 
2001); A. Yaghi, ‘Popular Testimonial Literature by American Cultural Conservatives of Arab or 
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described Hirsi Ali’s work as a falsification of the emancipatory function often 
attributed to autobiographical writing, offering instead ‘a reinforcement of the 
dominant order through the “authentic” voice of the victim.’3 Due to the personal 
nature of the narrative, Hirsi Ali’s biographical narrative is immediately imbued 
with an authority that other forms of non-fiction writing would need to proof 
through argument, leaving them open to criticism. As a result, Hirsi Ali’s writing 
seduces readers and scholars alike in the belief that her views on Islam are an 
expression of her personal experiences, resulting in an influential impact on 
academia. Saba Mahmood has commented on the uncritical popularity with 
which Hirsi Ali’s work has been received in some American university 
departments.4 And Adam Yaghi points to the growing appeal of Hirsi Ali’s work 
in academia ‘where her serial autobiographies are treated as honest and reliable 
testimonies’.5 The analysis offered here follows up on recent calls for more 
critical scholarly engagement with Hirsi Ali’s work by authors such as Grewal, 
Mahmood and Yaghi.  
 
While there exists a growing literature on Hirsi Ali containing cogent critiques of 
the essentializing and simplifying quality of her writing, this article tries to take 
                                                                                                                                                              
Muslim Descent: Narrating the Self, Translating (an)Other’, Middle East Critique, 25:1 (2016), pp. 
83-98; D. Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012). N. 
Gana, ‘Introduction: Race, Islam, and the Task of Muslim and Arab American Writing’, PMLA 
123:5 (2008), pp. 1577–1578; M. Bosch ‘Telling stories, creating (and saving) her life: An analysis 
of the autobiography of Ayaan Hirsi Ali’, Women's Studies International Forum 31 (2008), pp. 
138–147.  
3 Grewal, ‘Reclaiming the Voice of the Third World Woman’, Interventions: International Journal 
of Postcolonial Studies, 14:4 (2012), pp. 569-590; p. 582. 
4 Mahmood, op. cit., p. 83.  
5 Yaghi, op. cit., p. 84 
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the argument one step further by offering an in-depth engagement with the 
literal text of Hirsi Ali’s biography. Hirsi Ali has rightly been labeled as an 
inauthentic voice by the aforementioned authors. This paper sets out to 
demonstrate in detail how her writing is inauthentic, showing the discord 
between Hirsi Ali’s political views on Islam and her personal experiences as 
described in her autobiography. The aim is to deconstruct her biographical 
narrative, situating Hirsi Ali’s writing in relation to two formative and interacting 
ideological influences: Sunni fundamentalism and neoconservatism. To do so 
convincingly, the analysis will necessarily cover some familiar terrain. It will use 
the work of Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel to unpack the contradictions of Hirsi 
Ali’s description of political Islam in her autobiography, and to show Hirsi Ali’s 
intellectual debt to Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington. But the argument 
proceeds along less familiar paths, in particular Hirsi Ali’s early intellectual and 
political development in the Netherlands and the essential role of Dutch 
neoconservatives in Hirsi Ali’s rise as a controversial public figure. The Dutch 
episode is key to understanding Hirsi Ali’s paradoxical description as 
‘contemporary doyen of “conservative left criticism”’.6  
 
What follows is an attempt at exposition in five sections: the first introduces 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s relation to Islamic fundamentalism and neoconservatism as 
described in Infidel and lays out the basic argument, the second looks at Sayyid 
Qutb’s Islamism, the third describes U.S. neoconservatism and the clash of 
civilizations paradigm, the fourth section explores the Dutch reception of U.S. 
                                                        
6 Mahmood, op. cit., p. 87. 
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neoconservatism, and the final chapter uses the preceding to contrast Hirsi Ali’s 
views on Islam with her autobiography, Infidel.  
 
I THE DOUBLE LIFE OF HIRSI ALI  
Infidel, the English edition of Hirsi Ali’s autobiography, was published in 2007 
and quickly became an international bestseller.7 Echoing the divisions in her 
personal trajectory, the book is divided in two parts: ‘My Childhood’ and ‘My 
Freedom’. In the first section is recounted how Hirsi Ali’s family, a prominent 
clan in Somalia, fled the country in 1976 during the dictatorship of Siad Barré, 
before the ensuing civil war. Their first place of refuge was Saudi Arabia, 
followed by sojourns in Ethiopia and finally Kenia, where she would stay for 
twelve years. There, Hirsi Ali came in contact with the Sahwa, the puritan 
religious revival that emanated from the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi 
Wahhabism, onto the broader domain of Sunni Islam. Hirsi Ali describes how she 
became part of this movement, through the religious education she received at 
the age of sixteen in Kenia, given by a certain ‘Sister Aziza’. Hirsi Ali recounts her 
subsequent conversion, how she started to veil herself in a hidjab, and read 
Islamist texts with a community of like-minded believers.  
In the process of escaping from an arranged marriage and coming to the 
Netherlands as a political refugee in 1992, Hirsi Ali slowly started repudiating 
her Islamic belief. She describes the day of her arrival as her ‘real birthday’: ‘the 
                                                        
7 A. Hirsi Ali, Infidel. (New York: Free Press, 2007). The Dutch edition appeared as Mijn Vrijheid 
(My Freedom) in 2006. 
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birth of me as a person, making decisions about my life on my own.’8 From 1995 
to 2000, Hirsi Ali studied political science in Leiden. Amongst others, she was 
taught by Paul Cliteur, a prominent New Atheist inspired by U.S. 
neoconservatism, and the former head of the thinktank of the conservative 
liberal party (VVD). Cliteur was part of a circle of neoconservative intellectuals 
who devoted themselves to the propagation of Western enlightenment values 
and the critique of religion, in particular Islam. After her studies, Hirsi Ali joined 
the thinktank of the Dutch Social Democrat Party (PvdA), the Wiarda Beckman 
Stichting (WBS), where she started writing on Islam and immigration. As shown 
below, Hirsi Ali’s writing at the WBS was inspired on the work of the 
neoconservative Orientalist Bernard Lewis. In the months after 9/11, Hirsi Ali’s 
critique of Islam could count on a receptive audience. While still working at the 
WBS, Hirsi Ali was adopted as their protégé by the neoconservative intellectual 
circle surrounding Cliteur. The group is described in her biography as the ‘Gent’s 
Club’: Chris Rutenfrans, Jaffe Vink, Paul Cliteur, Sylvain Ephimenco, Hans 
Wansink, Leon de Winter and Herman Philipse. She refers to Frits Bolkestein, the 
erstwhile Eurocommisioner and former leader of the conservative liberal party 
(VVD), probably the most prominent Dutch exponent of neoconservative ideas – 
as her ‘intellectual mentor’ in the acknowledgements.9 After calling Islam a 
‘backward religion’ on Dutch public television in September 2002, Hirsi Ali 
started receiving death threats. She became an instant celebrity in the heated 
debate on freedom of speech, women emancipation and Islam that followed. 
Following a short period in the U.S., hiding from the threats, Hirsi Ali, exchanged 
                                                        
8 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 188. 
9 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 352. 
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the thinktank of the PvdA for a position as parliament member of the VVD. After 
a spectacular and controversial political career as a parliament member for the 
VVD, Ayaan Hirsi Ali moved to the United States in 2006, where she started 
working for the American Enterprise Institute, a prominent neoconservative 
thinktank. She subsequently married the neoconservative author Niall Ferguson.  
With this remarkable course of life, Ayaan Hirsi Ali is one of the few people to 
have been part of both the Islamic fundamentalist and the neoconservative 
movement. In this itinerary of contrasting conversions and opposing allegiances, 
the strategic use of enemy images and essentialism that is inherent to both 
currents, provides a connecting thread. ‘You’re either with us, or against us’, 
would become a shared mantra of both George W. Bush and Osama Bin Laden. 
Both movements are seen to derive strength and legitimacy from an aggressive 
opponent. Both movements share an essentialist view of Islam, in which the 
fundamentalist perspective is seen as the true nature of Islam. In his book War 
for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, the French Middle East scholar Gilles Kepel 
described the ascendency of these movements and famously argued that both 
are to a certain degree each other’s mirror image, feeding and reinforcing each 
other.10 Infidel is a poignant example of that confluence. In her autobiography, 
Hirsi Ali has sought to consciously transpose the fundamentalist image of Islam, 
known to her from her teenage years, unto the Islamic world as a whole. This 
fundamentalist image – defined by a literalist approach to Quran and Hadith; the 
myth of the timelessness of Islam; the stress on Islam’s inherent hostility to 
modernity and the West; and the view of Islam as an all-embracing societal 
                                                        
10 G. Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2004).  
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system – bears a striking resemblance to the perspective on Islam in the ‘Islam 
criticism’ developed by neoconservatives, which has its roots in the Western 
tradition of Orientalism. As the Middle East scholar Olivier Roy writes: ‘Critics of 
Islam and Muslim fundamentalists are mirrors of each other, and each 
corroborates the other in the view of Islam that they share, merely with the signs 
reversed.’11 
Hirsi Ali has made ample use of these analytical tools of Western Orientalism. 
Following Edward Said, the principal dogma’s of Orientalism, a long tradition of 
partisan Western scholarship regarding Islam and the Orient - can be reduced to 
four themes. First, ‘the absolute and systemic difference between the West, 
which is rational developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, 
undeveloped, inferior’. Second, ‘abstractions about the orient’, particularly those 
based on texts representing a classical Oriental civilization, are always 
preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. Third, ‘the 
Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself.’ Four, ‘the Orient is at 
bottom something either to be feared […] or to be controlled.’12 As we will see, 
the above themes characterize Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s views on Islam. Which is 
unsurprising if we consider that they are largely inspired on the work of the 
Orientalist Bernard Lewis, a principle target of Said’s critique. Hirsi Ali can 
rightfully be described as a ‘native informant’, a term used by Edward Said to 
describe an Oriental scholar sitting ‘at the feet of American Orientalists’, who 
uses his Western training ‘to feel superior to his own people, because he ‘is able 
                                                        
11 O. Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 43. 
12 E. Said, Orientalism, (London: Penguin, 1978), p. 300.  
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to ‘manage’ the Orientalist system.’13 Orientalism, according to Said, has a 
theatrical quality, and he describes that learned system of viewing the Orient as a 
‘stage on which the whole East is confined’:  
 
‘On this stage will appear figures whose role it is to represent the 
larger whole from which they emanate. The Orient then seems to be, 
not an unlimited extension beyond the familiar European world, but 
rather a closed field, a theatrical stage affixed to Europe.’14  
Ayaan Hirsi Ali is an actor on that theatrical stage, representing the Orient to a 
Western audience. Specific to Hirsi Ali is that she uses the Orientalist paradigm, 
not so much to study Islam or her society of origin, but to make sense of her own 
personal story, and to adapt that experience so as to fit into the public role she 
has crafted for herself on the confined space of the stage. In other words, she is a 
‘native informant’ with regards to her own life. Hirsi Ali has offered her personal 
story as an illustration of the clash of civilizations thesis developed by Bernard 
Lewis and Samuel Huntington, referring to her life as ‘a personal journey 
through the clash of civilizations’15. In Brown Skin, White Masks, the Iranian 
scholar Hamid Dabashi writes fiercely of critics of Islam such as Ibn Warraq and 
Hirsi Ali as ‘native informers who at once inhabit and target, personify and 
alienate, the hated abstraction they wish to exorcise from the moral psychosis 
that has posited them as aliens.’ For Dabashi, the particularity of Ayaan Hirsi Ali 
                                                        
13 E. Said, ibid., pp. 323-324.  
14 E. Said, ibid., p. 63.  
15 A. Hirsi Ali, Nomad. From Islam to America: a Personal Journey Through the Clash of 
Civilizations, (New York: Free Press, 2010). 
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 9
is that her aversion ‘for her own collective identity remains abstract and hidden 
within the stories that she keeps weaving about her life.’16 By retracing the 
intellectual ‘double life’ of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, this text aims to deconstruct the 
staged persona she has created, thus revealing and making concrete what has 
remained hidden and abstract.  
 
II QUTB AND POLITICAL ISLAM 
The Sunni Islamist part of the story has its crystallisation point in the figure of 
Sayyid Qutb. Born in 1906 in a traditional rural context in Egypt, Qutb first 
became a teacher, then a prominent intellectual, and finally the most important 
voice of modern Sunni Islamism.17 The Sunni Islamist movement has its origins 
in the nineteen thirties, when Hasna al-Banna, the Egyptian founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Abul-Ala Maududi, the leader of the Indian-Pakistani 
Jamaat-i-Islami party, founded a new political movement that aimed to reinvent 
Islam as a political order. Qutb would build on the work of al-Banna and 
Maudadi, with the goal of developing Islam into a holistic alternative for modern 
20th century ideologies. The leading Middle East scholar Olivier Roy - whose 
interpretation I will follow here, with the aid of John Calvert’s probing 
intellectual biography of Qutb - defines this movement as Islamism or political 
                                                        
16 H. Dabashi, Brown Skin, White Masks, (London: Pluto Press, 2011), p. 92. 
17 For reasons of brevity, the focus of this article is restricted to the Sunnite tradition, which has 
been central to Hirsi Ali’s development. The Shiite tradition will not be discussed, since it 
occupies a more marginal presence in the life and writings of Hirsi Ali.  
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Islam, because it redefines Islam as a political ideology.18 This attempt at the 
modernisation of Islam was paradoxically given legitimacy by presenting it as a 
restoration, a return to the source, to the original texts and the original 
inspirations of the first community of believers under the Prophet Mohammed. 
Islamism, Roy argues, is a movement that denies its own historicity.  
The core proposition of the work of Olivier Roy is that this movement, of which 
Qutb would become the intellectual epicentre, is a product of modernity. Both 
sociologically and intellectually, Roy states, Islamism is a result of the rapid 
modernisation process of the Muslim world. Like Qutb himself, the vanguard of 
adherents and disseminators of political Islam did not originate from traditional 
Islamic clergy (the ulamas). They did not write in the ancient Arabic, the learned 
language of the Koran, but in national popular languages. The Islamists ‘are a 
product of the modern education system’, Roy writes, ‘where they took classes 
together with militant Marxists, whose concepts they used, and translated in the 
terminology of Koran.’19 In Islamism, special attention is given to organisational 
form, reminiscent of Leninist vanguard parties on the one hand (the role of party 
secretary is fulfilled by the Amir and that of the central committee by the Shura, 
the advisory council) and the Sufi brotherhoods on the other.20 
Like other Muslim intellectuals of his generation, Sayyid Qutb searched for a 
formula to modernise Islam, in such a way that Western technological and 
                                                        
18 J. Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam (Caïro: The American University in Cairo 
Press, 2011). 
19 O. Roy, The failure of Political Islam (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 40. 
20 Roy, ibid., p. 3. 
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scientific knowledge could be assimilated without the accompanying liberal 
values. For that to occur, Islam had to be developed into a fundamentalist and 
all-embracing societal ‘ideology’ (fikra), a term derived from European 
progressive thought. For Qutb, a reinvented Islamic ideology had to function as 
an alternative to Third World nationalism, communism, capitalism, and liberal 
democracy. The titles of Qutb’s most popular books, published around 1950, are 
a good indication of the worldly character of his religious thought: Social Justice 
in Islam (1949), The Battle between Capitalism and Islam (1951) en Islam and 
World Peace (1951). The central idea in these books is holism: Qutb describes 
Isam as nizam, an integrated order that encapsulates economy, society and 
politics.21 This fundamentalist vision must be realized by the creation of an 
Islamic state, starting at the national level. This was an important innovation. In 
traditional Islam, Roy writes, ‘[t]he state is never considered in terms of a 
territorialized nation-state: the ideal is to have a power that would rule over the 
entirety of the umma, the community of th  faithful, while actual power is 
exercised over a segment of the umma whose borders are contingent, 
provisional, and incomplete.’22 The term nizam is also a modern invention, and is 
not to be found in the Koran.23 The break with Islamic tradition consists in that 
the idea of divine unity (tawhid) is now applied on society, while before it only 
referred to God. Society needs to be a reflection of God’s unity. But where God’s 
unity is natural, in society it will have to be constructed. A holistic society does 
not tolerate intrinsic segmentation, be it social, ethnic, or tribal, or national, or a 
                                                        
21 Calvert, op. cit., p. 130. 
22 Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, op. cit., p. 13. 
23 Calvert, op. cit., p. 130. 
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political order that claims autonomy from divine order.24 Therein lies the 
fundamentalist aspect of Islamism. Before the 20th century, Islam was used as a 
verb describing a practice of personal belief and dedication. Only after the 
creation of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hasan al-Banna, does the word attain the 
meaning that Qutb bestows on it: an integrated societal system.25 
Following the military coup of Nasser and the Free Officers in 1953, Qutb joined 
the Muslim Brotherhood and became the intellectual leader of the movement. 
The Brotherhood saw Nasser’s regime as an opportunity to implement their 
fervently desired Islamic state in Egypt. Nasser, however, chose for a path of 
secular modernisation and relations with the Brotherhood turned sour. The 
Muslim Brotherhood subsequently attempted to overthrow the Nasser 
government. The regime of the Free Officers then decided to eliminate the 
Brotherhood and arrests hundreds of its most prominent members. Qutb was 
among them. In the years of imprisonment that followed, Qutb was tortured and 
his views radicalized. His writings in prison were oriented at formulating an 
Islamic doctrine that would legitimate a revolt against sovereign power (as in 
Christian faith, obedience to God-given authority is required in Islam). Qutb does 
that, on the one hand, by placing divine authority (hakimiyya, again a term not 
existing in Quran) above state sovereignty and popular sovereignty. And on the 
other, by stating that Muslim societies in which this godly sovereignty is not 
recognised, in which there is no attempt to implement divine law (sharia) are in 
reality in a state of unbelief. Under Western influence, a form of bad faith had 
                                                        
24 Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, pp. 40-41. 
25 Calvert, op. cit., p. 130. 
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developed amongst the political elites of Muslim countries, as in society more 
broadly. Qutb called this Jahiliyya (a state of unbelief) a Koranic concept that 
refers to the situation in the Arabic world before the arrival of Islam. Obedience 
to secular authorities implied disobedience to divine authority:  
‘God (limitless is He in His glory) says that this whole issue is one of 
faith or unfaith, Islam and non-Islam, Divine law or human prejudice. 
No compromise or reconciliation can be worked out between these 
two sets of values. Those who judge on the basis of the law God has 
revealed, enforcing all parts of it and substituting nothing else for it, 
are the believers. By contrast, those who do not make the law God has 
revealed the basis of their judgement, are unbelievers, wrongdoers 
and transgressors.’26  
Qutb’s views are a mirror image to the friend-enemy distinction employed by the 
neoconservatives, as we shall see later on. Qutb makes a comparable back and 
white distinction between true Islam and the enemies of Islam, compounded by 
essentialist views of Jews, communists, westernised elites, Orientalists and other 
opponents of true Islam. In spite of the fact that Qutb saw his modernized 
version of Islam as relying on ‘Western ways of thought’, he portrayed Western 
thinking as especially hostile to Islam, due to the fact that Western science had 
developed historically in opposition to religion: 
                                                        
26 Cited in J. Calvert, ibid., p. 216. Qutb stopped short of calling individual Muslims unbelievers 
(kafirs): ‘Whereas the kafir is a person who intentionally disbelieves in God, the jahili individual 
sees himself as a believer yet dismisses Islam’s prerogative to govern all aspects of life.’ J. Calvert, 
ibid., p. 220 
Page 13 of 44
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ftmp  Email: editor-tmpr@intr.keele.ac.uk
Politics, Religion & Ideology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 14
‘The Western ways of thought and all the sciences started on the 
foundation of these poisonous influences with an enmity towards all 
religions, and in particular with greater hostility towards Islam. This 
enmity towards Islam is especially pronounced and many times is the 
result of a well thought out scheme, the object of which is first to 
shake the foundations of Islamic beliefs and then gradually to 
demolish the structure of Muslim society.’27  
An important contradiction in the thought of Qutb is the conviction that it is 
possible to have unmediated access to divine teachings. Islam, according to Qutb, 
is a doctrine that exists outside of human consciousness, as objective truth. 
Interpretation must be avoided as much as possible, so that human ignorance, 
individual desire, or group interests won’t contaminate the purity of the 
doctrine. When confronted with an explicit text in the Koran or the Hadith, there 
is no space for ijtihad (personal appraisal), according to Qutb.28 In the case of 
uncertainty, interpretation only serves to ascertain divine truth. A scenario in 
which several interpretations come to coexist, a normal situation given the 
diversity of Islamic jurisprudence, is not deemed to be possible, there is only 
right and wrong. Since the assessment of clarity already requires human 
judgement, and in the case of uncertainty, there is no basis for assessing the 
correctness of an interpretation, that vision is tautological. Ultimately, Qutb’s 
method requires a personal (and political) decision on the interpretation of 
divine truth, a decision that remains veiled behind the appeal to unmediated 
                                                        
27 S. Qutb, Milestones: Ma’alim fi’l-tareeq (Birmingham: Maktabah, 2006 [1964]), p. 128. 
28 Qutb, ibid., p. 43. 
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access. However, this approach allows Qutb and the Islamist movement to 
marginalize the traditional Islamic clergy such as the Egyptian Al-Azhar 
University, who traditionally have a monopoly on interpreting the religious texts 
and politically loyal to existing regimes.  
Qutb interprets and innovates to an important degree, by introducing new 
concepts, or by giving new meaning to existing terms. Denying the innovative 
aspects of his approach allows Qutb to articulate a political programme in the 
name of Islam, while cementing his vision in an appeal to divine truth. When 
Qutb is released from prison in 1964, members of the Muslim Brotherhood are 
working on the creation of an underground military organisation. Qutb takes 
personal charge of the operation. When the organisation is discovered, the 
Nasser regime decides to round up the Muslim Brotherhood, and to give Qutb 
the death sentence.  
Qutb would go down in history as a martyr. The Muslim Brotherhood, however, 
distanced itself from the more radical aspects of his legacy, rejecting the 
revolutionary Jahiliyya doctrine. The strategy of catastrophic revolution was 
abandoned for reformism and missionary work from the ground up. Only God 
has the authority to judge the veracity of the belief of other Muslims, Hudaybi 
argued, then Brotherhood leader. That continues to be the majority position in 
the Sunni world: failures in practice, be they crimes or omissions of worship, do 
not exclude a person from the community of believers, only the confession of the 
faith matters. Nonetheless, in the following years, Qutbism inspired radicals all 
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over the Sunni Islamic world. From that moment on, the Islamist movement is 
seen to be divided between a reformist and a revolutionary pole.29 
The reformist pole is exemplified by Mohammed Qutb, the brother of Sayyid 
Qutb. He was invited by the Saudi monarchy – and with him many other Muslim 
Brothers –to integrate Islamism with the Saudi tradition of Wahhabism, an ultra 
conservative, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. At the time, the Saudi 
Monarchy saw the Muslim Brotherhood as an appropriate tool to form an 
international counterweight to the appeal of secular pan-Arabism, and from 
1979 on, revolutionary Shiism from Iran. On a national level, this was inspired by 
strategic concerns to limit the influence of Wahhabi clerics on Saudi society, by 
providing them with a competing doctrine. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia thus 
became a site of refuge for the radical religious opposition movements against 
secular Arab regimes that were often aligned with the Soviet Union. This 
development was actively encouraged by the United States, as part of its Cold 
War strategy. Large amounts of Saudi oil-dollars were invested to facilitate this 
new religious movement. From the convergence of the activist impulse of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the literalist, strict and puritanical approach of the 
Wahhabi tradition, also described as Salafism, the Sahwa (the awakening) 
emerged.30 Both Islamists and Salafists can be described as fundamentalist, 
although they differ in the nature of their fundamentalism, with Islamists more 
prone to challenge the political status quo and Salafists more focused on 
                                                        
29 Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, op. cit., p. 24. 
30 While all Wahhabists are Salafists, not all Salafists are Wahhabists, which is the Saudi current 
in Salafism. 
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personal piety. This movement became very prominent in the eighties and would 
take up the young Hirsi Ali in its sweep.31  
One of the younger Muslim Brothers, and a scion of the Egyptian elite, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, continued the revolutionary tradition of Islamism, and radicalised the 
ideas of Qutb even further. He became part of the group Islamic Jihad that 
assassinated Sadat in 1981, basing themselves on the revolutionary ideas Qutb 
had formulated. Heavy repression followed, and when Zawahiri was released 
from prison, he continued his activities as part of the Afghan Moedjehadien, 
where he met Bin Laden. Here, Salafist and Islamist radicals successfully 
mingled, as the guerrilla fighters were trying to live their lives (and fight) 
according to a very literal interpretation of scripture. After the success of the 
guerrilla war against the Soviet Union, he took up the plan to take aim, not at the 
corrupt Arabic regimes (the nearby enemy), but directly at the puppet player 
itself: the United States (the faraway enemy). He became the mentor of Bin 
Laden and the second in command of Al Qaeda. 
 
II NEOCONSERVATISM 
Neoconservatism gradually developed out of the anti-Stalinism of the thirties 
and the Cold War liberalism of the fifties and sixties. The beneficial nature of the 
struggle against an external threat has always been central to its worldview.32 
                                                        
31 J. Calvert, op. cit., p. 276. 
32 J. Vaïsse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2010); P. Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men who are Changing America’s 
Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979). 
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Neoconservatives have championed an image of the world as divided by a 
dramatic conflict of starkly contrasted forces of good and evil. They have 
stressed the benevolent nature of America’s dominant role in the world, as a 
harbinger of democracy and human rights. The philosophy of Leo Strauss has 
provided an important theoretical reference point. Strauss, a Jewish refugee 
from the Nazi regime, rose to prominence at the University of Chicago in the 
fifties, and would spawn a Straussian school of philosophy. Amongst the 
Straussians were many neoconservatives who would later acquire positions of 
power in government, in military and foreign policy circles, and in 
neoconservative thinktanks.33 Elaborating on the thesis of the German Nazi-
jurist Carl Schmitt that friend-enemy distinctions form the essence of politics, 
Strauss saw the struggle against an enemy – portrayed as an absolute moral evil 
– as a necessary condition for the construction and maintenance of a healthy and 
hierarchical political order.34 In a personal letter to Schmitt, Strauss expressed 
this philosophy thusly: 
‘The ultimate foundation of the Right is the principle of the natural 
evil of man; because man is by nature evil, he therefore needs 
dominion. But dominion can be established, that is man can be unified, 
only in a unity against – against other man. Every association of men 
is necessarily a separation from other men. The tendency to separate 
                                                        
33 A. Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2004). 
34 S. Drury, The political ideas of Leo Strauss, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988). 
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(and therewith the grouping of humanity into friends and enemies) is 
given with human nature; it is in this sense destiny, period.’35 
At first, communism served this function. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many 
in the U.S. establishment were convinced that a new rationale for conflict - and 
therefore a new enemy - needed to be identified. The initial impetus in that effort 
was given by the Princeton-based Orientalist Bernard Lewis.36 In 1990, a month 
after the beginning of the First Gulf War, Lewis published the essay The Roots of 
Muslim Rage in The Atlantic. It’s message immediately caused controversy: ‘This 
is no less than a clash of civilizations - the perhaps irrational but surely historic 
reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular 
present, and the worldwide expansion of both.’37 It wasn’t Western intervention 
in Muslim countries, or Western support for dictatorial regimes that lead to 
virulent anti-Americanism in the Middle East. The hatred of Muslims against the 
West, Lewis wrote, ‘goes beyond hostility to specific interests or actions or 
policies or even countries and becomes a rejection of Western civilization as 
such, not only what it does but what it is, and the principles and values that it 
practices and professes. These are indeed seen as innate evil, and those who 
promote them or accept them as the “enemies of God”.’38 The author came to this 
startling conclusion by presenting Islamic fundamentalism as an authentic 
                                                        
35 Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The hidden dialogue. (Chicago: 1995), p. 125. 
36 Emran Qureshi, and Michael Sells eds., The New Crusades: constructing the Muslim Enemy. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003).  
37 Bernard Lewis, ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage,’ The Atlantic Monthly 266/3 (1990), pp. 47-60, p. 
48. 
38 Lewis, ibid., p. 48 
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return to ‘the classic Islamic view’. Lewis tactically embraced the fundamentalist 
definition of Islam and turned it against the Islamic religion as a whole. By thus 
projecting enmity on the entire religion of Islam, Lewis employed a friend-enemy 
distinction of his own. The hawks in the U.S. foreign policy establishment soon 
embraced Lewis’ thesis as a notion that could serve as a guide for future conflict. 
After 9/11, Bernard Lewis (together with the Lebanese scholar and ‘native 
informant’ Fouad Ajami) became the Bush administration’s preferred academic 
expert on the Middle East, visiting Washington six times in the weeks after 
9/11.39 It is not surprising then, that Lewis’ thesis became an important mantra 
of the Bush administration after 9/11: ‘Why do they hate us? [...] They hate our 
freedoms’. 40  
In 1993, Huntington took up the thesis of Lewis in a groundbreaking essay titled 
The Clash of Civilizations?, published in the journal of the U.S. diplomatic and 
military establishment, Foreign Affairs.41 In 1996, Huntington expanded on the 
essay in his famous book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order. Controversially, Huntington defined Islam (and secondarily China, or the 
Confucianist civilization) as the primary source of civilizational conflict for the 
West. The ‘centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is 
unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent,’ Huntington suggested. As 
Gilles Kepel pointed out, ‘Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory facilitated the 
                                                        
39 See Nicholas Lemann’s extended profile of the Bush foreign policy team for the New Yorker: N. 
Lemann, ‘The Next World Order’, The New Yorker, April 1, 2002. 
40 Speech of George W. Bush, September 20, 2001. Reprinted in The Washington Post, September 
20, 2001.  
41 S. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, 72/3 (1993), pp. 22-49. 
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transfer to the Muslim world of a strategic hostility the West had inherited from 
decades of Cold War. […] The neoconservative movement played a crucial role in 
bringing about this rhetorical and theoretical permutation.’42  
 
III THE DUTCH RECEPTION OF NEOCONSERVATISM  
When Ayaan Hirsi Ali was catapulted in the public limelight, to become one of the 
most influential and controversial political figures of the decade, her appearance 
formed part of a larger emergence of a Dutch neoconservative movement. In 
February 2001, a much-discussed essay appeared in the Dutch newspaper of 
note, NRC. It boldly declared that ‘the conservative moment’ had come. Referring 
to U.S. neoconservatism, the essay proposed its propagation in the Netherlands: 
‘In the past 25 years, conservative thought in the Western world has witnessed a 
veritable revolution. Now is the time for conservatives in the Netherlands to 
attempt to reap its benefits.’43 The author was Joshua Livestro, at that moment 
the speechwriter of Frits Bolkestein, then European Commissioner and former 
leader of the right-wing liberal party VVD. Two months earlier, together with the 
neoconservative thinker Bart Jan Spruyt, VVD-intellectual Andreas Kinneging 
and the lawyer Michiel Visser, Livestro had founded an influential conservative 
think-tank, the Edmund Burke foundation. Also Paul Cliteur, former teacher of 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a law professor in the Dutch city of Leiden and former director of 
the VVD thinktank, became part of the foundation, together with his colleague, 
the Iranian emigré Afshin Ellian. Cliteur had written his PhD on U.S. 
                                                        
42 Kepel, op. cit., pp. 62-63. 
43 Joshua Livestro, ‘Het Conservatieve Moment is Gekomen,’ NRC Handelsblad, February 3, 2001. 
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neoconservatism in 1989 and - together with Bolkestein – debated 
neoconservative ideas with members of the VVD in the nineties.44 Afshin Ellian 
had been part of the communist Tudeh party in Iran, but had to flee after the 
Iranian Revolution, in fear of the Islamic regime. In the Netherlands he turned to 
neoconservatism, aligned himself with the Right, and became one of the most 
vocal critics of Islam. He served as an inspiration for Hirsi Ali, who saw him as a 
Dutch counterpart to Salman Rushdie.45  
The polarized aftermath of 9/11 provided the ideal environment for 
neoconservatives to come out of the closet. While the political culture in the 
Netherlands is traditionally consensual, moderate and uneventful, this soon 
changed. The right-wing populist politician Pim Fortuyn, himself inspired to an 
important degree by neoconservative ideas, declared a ‘cold war against Islam’ a 
little more than two weeks before 9/11. ‘The role of communism’ in serving as a 
threat to Western norms and values, according to Fortuyn, had been ‘taken over 
                                                        
44 See Paul Cliteur: ‘When I wrote an article in 1987 on Irving Kristol, I didn’t think there was 
anyone in the Netherlands that seriously studied his work. But who compares the book of Kristol 
with the ideas of the aforementioned thinkers (VVD-intellectuals such as Bolkestein, Kinneging 
and Van der List, MO) will find significant similarities… The ideologues of the VVD have gone 
through a trajectory from Rawls to Hayek, and from Hayek to Kristol, or so it seems.’ P. Cliteur,  
‘Neo-conservatisme en religie: Irving Kristol als nieuwe beschermheer van het liberale denken?,’ 
Civis Mundi 35, October 1996, pp. 119-124, p. 121.  
45 ‘Very few Muslims are actually capable of looking at their faith critically. Critical minds like 
those of Afshin Ellian in the Netherlands and Salman Rushdie in England are exceptions.’ A. Hirsi 
Ali, The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam, (New York: Free 
Press, 2006), p. 32. 
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by Islam’.46 After the attacks, Fortuyn’s electoral fortunes took flight and he 
successfully campaigned on a platform to forcefully assimilate Muslim 
immigrants. In May 2002 an animal rights activist assassinated Fortuyn, causing 
a national outcry and leading to a landslide election victory for his now 
leaderless party. When in 2004, the filmmaker, columnist and Islam critic Theo 
Van Gogh was brutally assassinated on the street by a Dutch-Moroccan jihadist 
because of his work with Hirsi Ali on the film Submission, the Netherlands came 
to perceive itself as a frontline in the global War on Terror. In this context, the 
neoconservative message of an epic struggle against a civilizational enemy could 
count on a warm reception. Bart-Jan Spruyt wrote on Carl Schmitt’s friend-
enemy distinction and argued that these political murders had shown that 
‘Western civilization now had an enemy’ in the Schmittian sense. Through 
confrontation with that enemy, Spruyt wrote, ‘we could come to rediscover our 
own identity’.47 In the years after 9/11, the Edmund Burke foundation 
revolutionized the Dutch debate and became the successful propagator of a - 
hitherto unknown and arguably never fully understood - neoconservative 
philosophy in the Netherlands.  
Neoconservatism also had influential adherents in the Dutch press. From 2001 
till 2006, journalists Jaffe Vink and Chris Rutenfrans used a weekly review-
section of the national newspaper Trouw to promote what they called ‘the 
neoconservative revolution’. Vink described the neoconservatives as ‘the 
                                                        
46 P. Fortuyn, ‘Koude oorlog met Islam’, Elsevier, August 25, 2001. 
47 B. Spruyt, De Toekomst van de Stad: Over Geschiedenis en Politiek (Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij 
Boekencentrum, 2005), p. 63. 
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revolutionaries of our time’ who ‘want to make the world safe for democracy’.48 
In their opinion section, they ardently supported the Iraq war and proposed to 
spread Western values in a ‘civilizing mission’ in the Middle East. In November 
2001, Vink and Rutenfrans organized a debate with the appropriate Manichean 
title ‘The West or Islam: who needs a Voltaire?’ in Amsterdam cultural centre De 
Balie. In Infidel, Ayaan Hirsi Ali describes her attendance and how she intervened 
from the stand exclaiming: ‘Allow us a Voltaire, because we are truly living in the 
Dark Ages’.49 At this occasion Hirsi Ali met Ellian, Vink and Rutenfrans, who 
invited her to write her first opinion piece on the theme of her intervention. 
From that point on, Jaffe Vink claimed Hirsi Ali as his discovery and protégé, and 
published several of Hirsi Ali’s opinion pieces in Trouw.50 Rutenfrans and Vink 
were the editors of Hirsi Ali’s first book, De Zoontjesfabriek.51 
In 2004, Bart Jan Spruyt became the ideologue of Geert Wilders, a popular right-
wing populist politician following in the anti-Islamic footsteps of Pim Fortuyn. 
Spruyt accompanied Wilders on a visit to neoconservative thinktanks in the U.S, 
and subsequently wrote the program of Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party, PVV, 
which unsurprisingly has strong neoconservative overtones.52 When Hirsi Ali 
switched from the PvdA to the VVD, and entered parliame t in January 2003 
                                                        
48 Jaffe Vink, ‘De Neoconservative Revolutie’, Trouw, February 12, 2006. 
49 Hirsi Ali, Infidel, op. cit., p. 275. 
50 See: ‘Paniek en Roem’, NRC Handelsblad October 12, 2002 
51 A. Hirsi Ali, De Zoontjesfabriek. Over Vrouwen, Islam en Integratie (Amsterdam: Augustus, 
2002).  
52 G. Wilders, Kies voor Vrijheid (Den Haag: PVV, 2006); Koen Vossen, ‘Classifying Wilders: The 
Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and His Party for Freedom’, Politics 31/3 (2011), pp. 
179-189. 
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with a huge preferential vote, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders campaigned 
together against the perceived Islamic threat.  
Besides obvious similarities and explicit affiliations, there are also some marked 
differences between the American and Dutch strands of neoconservative 
thinking. The particularity of the Dutch context has marked Hirsi Ali’s position, 
and given her difficulties in integrating in the American political context. These 
differences can be summarized in three points: 
While U.S. neoconservatism is a secular ideology, it considers religion to be an 
indispensible addition to liberalism and an important instrument for the spread 
of conservative values. A natural consequence is that neoconservatives formed a 
coalition with the religious Right, and defended conservative sexual morality in 
the culture wars. The Netherlands is to an overwhelming degree a secular 
context, with a largely progressive sexual morality. Dutch neoconservatives 
therefore chose to occupy a different position and defended progressive 
achievements - Enlightenment values, secularism, gay rights and women’s 
emancipation - against the perceived threat of Islam, in what has been called 
‘sexual nationalism’.53 It is in this context that Hirsi Ali could claim to speak as a 
progressive feminist, receiving considerable support from leading Dutch liberal 
feminists such as Cisca Dresselhuys and Social Democrat intellectuals such as 
Paul Scheffer and Joost Zwagerman. This defence of progressive values by Dutch 
conservatives is at the root of Hirsi Ali’s paradoxical description by Saba 
                                                        
53 See: P. Mepschen, J. W. Duyvendak, and E.Tonkens, ‘Sexual Politics, Orientalism and 
Multicultural Citizenship in the Netherlands’, Sociology 44: 1 (2010), pp. 962-979; M. 
Oudenampsen, ‘Post-Progressive Politics, The Conservative Embrace of Progressive Values’, 
Paper presented at the conference of the European Sociological Association, Prague, 2015.  
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Mahmood as a ‘doyen of “conservative left criticism”’.54 The most prominent 
Dutch neoconservatives, such as Cliteur, Ellian and Hirsi Ali were New Atheists, 
opposing religion as such. It is significant that Hirsi Ali has reconsidered her 
position on the role of Christianity since her arrival in the U.S. 
The focus of U.S. neoconservative efforts, from the seventies on, was foreign 
policy, and the fight with foreign ‘enemies’. With regard to Islam, the U.S. 
domestic context has been a less significant theme. For U.S. neoconservatives, the 
superiority of Western civilization and the universalism of Western values or 
human rights served as an argument legitimizing foreign intervention.55 For 
Dutch neoconservatives, the primary concern was domestic policy, namely the 
issue of Muslim immigrants. Neoconservative arguments concerning the 
superiority of western values were primarily used to argue for the forceful 
assimilation of immigrants. It was then VVD-leader Frits Bolkestein who in the 
nineties first pointed towards the incompatibility of Western and Muslim values, 
starting off the debates on immigration and multiculturalism that transformed 
Dutch politics in the wake of Fortuyn.56 This theme of superior and incompatible 
civilizational values, was subsequently taken up by Fortuyn, Cliteur, Spruyt and 
Hirsi Ali.  
Finally, while the currency of choice of U.S. neoconservatives largely consists of 
hard power, most famously through military intervention in Iraq, Dutch 
neoconservatives have been focused on combating Islam largely through soft 
power, or rhetoric. A choice that is likely informed by the absence of a significant 
                                                        
54 Mahmood, op. cit., p. 87. 
55 Vaisse, op. cit., p. 118.  
56 Prins, op. cit., pp. 363-379 
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Dutch military or foreign policy. Consequently, freedom of speech became one of 
the most important banners of the Dutch neoconservatives. While Huntington 
couched the clash of civilizations in military terms, the Dutch neoconservatives 
presented it as a predominantly rhetorical battle for the hearts and minds of the 
Western Muslim population, even though the target audience of this anti-
immigrant discourse was the white Dutch majority.57 Only after her arrival in the 
U.S., did Hirsi Ali begin to couch her opposition to Islam in military terms, 
pleading to defeat Islam militarily in a controversial interview published in 
Reason. 58 
 
 
IV DECONSTRUCTING AYAAN  
A commonly held opinion is that Hirsi Ali’s views have developed and radicalized 
gradually over time, in reaction to real life occurrences such as 9/11, the death 
threats she received, her switch to the VVD, or the brutal assassination of her 
collaborator on the film Submission, Theo van Gogh. Retrospectively, Hirsi Ali 
also presented her trajectory in Infidel as a response to 9/11, identified by her as 
a moment of political awakening: ‘the little shutter at the back of my mind, where 
I pushed all my dissonant thoughts, snapped open after the 9/11 attacks, and it 
refused to close again.’59 She describes herself in the weeks after the attacks as a 
deeply confused Muslim:  
                                                        
57 I. Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam (New York: Penguin Books, 2007). 
58 ‘The Trouble is the West: Ayaan Hirsi Ali on Islam, Immigration, Civil Liberties, and the fate of 
the West.’ Interview of Ayaan Hirsi Ali by Rogier van Bakel. Reason, November 2007. 
59 Hirsi Ali, Infidel, op. cit., p. 272. 
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War had been declared in the name of Islam, my religion, and now I 
had to make a choice. Which side was I on? I found I couldn’t avoid 
the question. Was this really Islam? Did Islam permit, even call for, 
this kind of slaughter? Did I, as a Muslim, approve of the attack? And if 
I didn’t, where did I stand on Islam? I walked around with these 
questions for weeks; I couldn’t get them out of my head. (Hirsi Ali 
2007: 269)  
 
None of that confusion is apparent, however, in those very same first weeks after 
9/11, when Hirsi Ali’s first published article appears in the monthly journal of 
the social democrat thinktank where she then worked as a researcher, bearing 
the title In Between Confrontation and Reconciliation: The Netherlands and 
Islam.60 The text analyzes the Dutch debate on Islam in the wake of 9/11, a 
discussion between those proposing a more confrontational approach and those 
advocating tolerance. After some deliberation, Hirsi Ali sides with those opting 
for a more confrontational approach, in order to ‘force Muslims to debate 
Islam’.61 That force is necessary because ‘in the perception of a Muslim, the 
Quran contains the truth and this truth is of all times and places. That makes it 
                                                        
60 The article originally appeared in the journal of the Dutch social democrat thinktank WBS. A. 
Hirsi Ali, ‘Tussen Confrontatie en Verzoening: Nederland en de Islam’, Socialisme & Democratie, 
58/10 (2001), pp. 446-451. It was published on October 10, 2001, and included in De 
Zoontjesfabriek, Hirsi Ali’s first book from 2002, but it has not been translated and published in 
The Caged Virgin.  
61 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 451 
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impossible for moderate Muslims to express doubts about the religion.’ 
Especially regarding three Islamic dogmas there is no substantive discussion 
possible, not between Muslims, nor between Muslims and non-Muslims:  
 
First, in Islam, ‘the individual and the community are inextricably bound up with 
each other. The will of Allah, as revealed in the Quran, determines ideology, 
politics, law, individual identity and his relation to the community.’ Secondly, ‘the 
loyalty of a Muslim to other Muslims is obligatory: in a conflict between Muslims 
and non-Muslims, sympathy and support will always go to Muslims first. Who 
violates this rule is a traitor and, according to the Quran, worse than 
unbelievers.’ The demand towards Muslims to ‘clearly distance themselves from 
acts of terror and radical Islam again and again faces the opposition of this 
loyalty principle.’ ‘Finally, there is the significance of the hereafter. Live on earth 
only counts as a passage towards eternal life after death […] When one doubts 
the unity of God or his words in the Koran, then you spoil your chances on a 
place in the hereafter.’62 Muslims are not allowed to doubt or ask questions 
concerning their faith, Hirsi Ali concludes.  
 
To be clear, these aren’t empirical observations about Muslim life, they are 
statements that primarily serve a political purpose. To take only the most 
obvious example: in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the attacks were widely 
and explicitly denounced by leading Muslim organisations around the world, 
                                                        
62 Hirsi Ali, ibid., pp. 450-551. 
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including Islamist organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.63 
The logical consequence of Hirsi Ali’s propositions on Islam is that of effectively 
binding together Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks with the whole of Islam, seeing 
that all Muslims are divinely ordained to be loyal to one another. She thus 
divides the world in two monolithic blocs, Islam versus the West, and questions 
the loyalty of Muslim immigrants in the West, who are pressed to choose sides - 
as individuals - against their own communities. In a typical case of textual 
determinism, Hirsi Ali reduces the everyday reality of contemporary Muslim life 
to the Quran, depicted as a body of closed norms, beyond discussion. Olivier Roy 
aptly characterised this type of Western criticism of Islam:  
 
‘[T]o define Islam as a body of closed norms and Muslims as making 
up a community excluding membership in any other group is 
precisely to adopt the fundamentalists’ definition of Islam. This is a 
reference to an imaginary Islam, not to the real Muslim world, and the 
fundamentalists are made into authentic representatives of Islam, 
                                                        
63 For example, on the 14th of September 2001, a communiqué was published condemning the 
9/11 attacks as ‘against all human and Islamic norms’. It’s signatories included leaders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Sudan, Syria and Jordan, Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami, Palestine’s 
Hamas movement, Tunisia’s Nahda movement, Malaysia’s PAS, Indonesia’s PKS, Morocco’s PJD, 
and scholars from Al-Azhar University. Statement published in the London-based Al-Quds Al-
Arabi newspaper, September 14, 2001. For the full text, see: 
http://nceis.unimelb.edu.au/about/projects/national_imams_consultative_forum/fatwa_and_ruli
ngs_against_terrorism_in_islam/sept11  
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even if this means speaking with benevolent condescension about the 
poor [Muslim] liberals who cannot make themselves heard.’64  
 
In that very first article, she writes how ‘moderate, benevolent Muslims’ are 
hopelessly uninformed about the true nature of their religion. The goal of the 
Western ‘dialogue’ with moderate Muslim immigrants, of forcing them to debate 
Islam, is to make Muslims more informed about the inherent radicalism and 
violence of their religion.65 This involves ‘civilizing’ and converting Muslims to 
what Hirsi Ali calls ‘Enlightenment’ or ‘reason’, as she wrote in the essay Why 
can’t we take a critical look at ourselves?, published in the neoconservative 
opinion section of newspape  Trouw in March 2002. Only by secularizing their 
faith – accepting scripture as man-made and Mohammed as a human, fallible 
figure – only by extracting themselves from their communities can Muslims 
become acceptable to the West. This is the binary vision of Enlightenment and 
Islam that Ayaan Hirsi Ali started out with, and that she would consistently 
continue to defend right up to her latest book, Heretic, in which the ideas of 
Bernard Lewis again figure prominently.66 Hirsi Ali’s writing, from the very start, 
is a well thought-out version of the clash of civilizations theory, drawing on 
Dutch New Atheists inspired by neoconservatism, such as Paul Cliteur and 
Herman Philipse on the one hand, and Orientalist authors such as Bernard Lewis 
and Lewis Pryce-Jones on the other. Put differently, Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s views on 
Islam are of decidedly Western extraction, and these ideas are - at times - in open 
                                                        
64 Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, op. cit., p. 42. 
65 Hirsi Ali, ‘Tussen Confrontatie en Verzoening’, op. cit., p. 451. 
66 A. Hirsi Ali, Heretic: Why Islam Needs A Reformation Now (New York: Harper Collins, 2014). 
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contradiction with Hirsi Ali’s own life story, as we shall soon see.  
 
The role of Orientalist authors in forming Hirsi Ali’s view of Islam can be 
deduced from her first more elaborate and theoretical text, published in the 
yearbook of the social democrat think-tank in the autumn of 2002 and translated 
and reprinted in The Caged Virgin. In the article, titled What went wrong? A 
modern clash of cultures after the well-known book by Bernard Lewis67, Hirsi Ali 
lays out her ideas on Islamic culture. Basing herself on Lewis and Pryce Jones, 
Hirsi Ali argues that ‘the religious-cultural identity’ of Muslims is characterised 
by:  
 
- ‘A hierarchical-authoritarian mentality: ‘The boss is almighty; others 
can only obey.’ 
- Group identity: ‘The group always comes before the individual’; if you 
do not belong to the clan/tribe you will be treated with suspicion or, at 
best, not be taken seriously.  
- A patriarchal mentality and a culture of shame: The woman has a 
reproductive function and must obey the male members of her family; 
failure to do so brings shame on the family.’68  
 
This is the classic Orientalist theme of timelessness, abstraction and uniformity. 
From the skyscrapers in Istanbul and Teheran, to the villages in rural Pakistan 
                                                        
67 Bernard Lewis, What went wrong? Western impact and Middle Eastern response (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
68 Hirsi Ali, The Caged Virgin, op. cit. 
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and Somalia, from the Indonesian archipelago to Muslim immigrants on the 
European mainland: there is a single, unchanging Islamic ‘religious-cultural 
identity’ that can be known in the abstract. ‘The Islamic identity (view of 
mankind and the world)’, Ayaan Hirsi Ali writes, ‘is based on groups, and its 
central concepts are honor and disgrace, or shame’.69  
 
Borrowing from Pryce-Jones, Hirsi Ali’s reasoning concerning the inherent 
‘backwardness’ and traditionalism of Islam revolves around its connection with 
tribal norms. The argument is as follows: the Quran consists of a set of rules that 
are adopted from tribal customs, specifically designed to organize the tribes in a 
coherent tribal system. Warring tribes were convinced to accept laws assuaging 
them to direct their animosity to unbelievers, leading to Islam’s inherently 
expansionist character and its hostility to the West. Tribal values are thus 
ingrained in the Quran, reproducing premodern practices, even in modern urban 
societies: ‘the ideas and traditions of Muhammed’s tribal society are adopted 
straight into the industrial and urban society of today’.70  
 
Is there any way out of this vicious circle for Muslims? Hirsi Ali wavers between 
Lewis and Pryce-Jones. She is appreciative of Lewis’ argument that either the 
lack of secularism or the patriarchal nature of Arab societies is responsible for 
their backwardness. Muslims can undertake the painful process of 
modernisation once they ‘relinquish their most substantial values’.71 Whereas 
                                                        
69 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 47 
70 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 52 
71 Hirsi Ali, ibid., pp. 52-53 
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Pryce-Jones believes that secularism and other Western developments can’t be 
truly understood by people living in what is essentially a tribal society. Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali chose Lewis’ vision, critiquing the Islamist idea of emancipation and 
equating emancipation with the escape from community:  
 
‘emancipation doesn’t mean the liberation of the community of the 
faithful or its safeguarding from the power of evil outside forces, such 
as colonialism, capitalism, the Jews and the Americans. It means the 
liberation of the individual from that same community of the 
faithful.’72  
 
Finally, she concludes her article in the yearbook by proposing to ‘interpret the 
concept of ‘integration’ as a process of civilization for groups of Muslim 
immigrants living within the Western society into which they have been 
received,’ and so ‘render superfluous the ps udodebate about the equality of 
cultures’.73 Here, the old colonial ‘civilizing mission’ is turned inwardly, towards 
the immigrants in the West. Considering integration to be a process of 
civilization is also good for the immigrants themselves since it allows them to 
‘develop an awareness of their level of achievement in relation to others’, and to 
‘see that in order to progress they need to behave according to the values and 
standards of their newly adopted home country’.74 In other words: making 
immigrants aware of their backwardness will make them happier to adjust.  
                                                        
72 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 32 
73 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 56 
74 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 56 
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Tactically choosing to adopt the Western Orientalist imaginary of Islam, instead 
of describing modern-day Muslim reality, Ayaan Hirsi Ali has had to work around 
a set of large contradictions from the outset. If power and authority are absolute 
and unassailable for the ‘primitive’ minds of Muslims, as Hirsi Ali has argued 
before, then what explains the revolt of Islamic fundamentalism against the 
Islamic status quo, sidelining the clerics, killing Sadat and denouncing the Saudi 
monarchy? And how can contemporary Muslim life be determined by the Quran, 
when the average Muslim ‘does little with his faith’, and ‘knows little of the 
Quran’?75 According to Hirsi Ali ‘most Muslims never delve into theology’, and 
‘rarely read the Quran’; ‘it is taught in Arabic, which most Muslims can’t speak’.76 
Here, Hirsi Ali wrestles with what Said has described as the second dogma of 
Orientalism: the notion that abstractions about the orient based on ancient texts, 
are preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern realities. She resolves that 
problem by introducing a tautology: ‘for many non-practicing Muslims, the 
essence of their identity and the system of values and morals by which they live 
remain Islamic’.77 Moroccan and Turkish immigrants have assimilated the 7th 
century tribal values embedded in the Quran, which are ‘adopted straight into 
the industrial and urban society of today’, without having understood or read the 
text itself.  
These contradictions come to a head in Infidel, where Hirsi Ali’s personal 
                                                        
75 Hirsi Ali, ‘Tussen Confrontatie en Verzoening’, op. cit., p. 450 
76 Hirsi Ali, Infidel, op. cit., p. 272 
77 Hirsi Ali, The Caged Virgin, op. cit., p. 44. 
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experiences openly contradict the views she adopted from Bernard Lewis. The 
paradoxical nature of fundamentalist Islam, as described by Roy, a modernizing 
break with tradition that represents itself as a return to tradition, is also to be 
found in Hirsi Ali’s autobiography:   
 
‘A new kind of Islam was on the march. It was much deeper, much 
clearer and stronger — much closer to the source of the religion — 
than the old kind of Islam my grandmother believed in, along with her 
spirit ancestors and djinns. It was not like the Islam in the mosques, 
where imams mostly recited by memory old sermons written by long-
dead scholars, in an Arabic that barely anyone could understand. It 
was not a passive, mostly ignorant, acceptance of the rules: Insh’Allah, 
‘God wills it.’ It was about studying the Quran, really learning about it, 
getting to the heart of the nature of the Prophet’s message. It was a 
huge evangelical sect backed massively by Saudi Arabian oil wealth 
and Iranian martyr propaganda. It was militant, and it was growing. 
And I was becoming a very small part of it’ 78 
 
Of course, the very notion of a ‘new’ kind of Islam, contradicts the earlier 
statement that Islam is ‘an unchanging, fossilized culture’.79 In Infidel, Hirsi Ali 
inadvertently stresses the innovative aspects of fundamentalist Islam, the break 
with old traditions and existing forms of religiosity: ‘Traditional ways of 
                                                        
78 Hirsi Ali, Infidel, op. cit., p. 88. 
79 Hirsi Ali, The Caged Virgin, op. cit., p. 153. 
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practicing Islam had become corrupted, diluted with ancient beliefs that should 
no longer have currency’.80 Fundamentalist Islam represents a break with the 
quietist passivity of mainstream Islam: ‘We were not like the passive old school, 
for whom Islam meant a few rules and more or less devoutly observed rituals, 
and who interlaced their Quran with tribal customs and magical beliefs in 
amulets and spirits. We were God’s shock troops.’81  
 
She writes about her immersion in political Islam:  
 
‘We read Hasan al-Banna, who set up the Society of Muslim Brothers 
to oppose the rise of Western ideas in the lands of Islam and promote 
a return to the Islam of the Prophet. We read Sayyid Qutb, another 
Egyptian, who said preaching was not enough, that we must stage a 
catastrophic revolution to establish the kingdom of God on Earth. We 
thrilled to new movements called Akhwan (Brotherhood) and 
Tawheed (the Straight Path); they were small groups of true 
believers, as we felt ourselves to be. This was the True Islam, this 
harking back to the purity of the Prophet’82  
Many of Olivier’s Roy observations concerning the modern character – in the 
sociological sense – of political Islam, can also be found in Hirsi Ali’s writing. The 
we-form that Ayaan Hirsi Ali employs in the quotations above, refers to an 
                                                        
80 Hirsi Ali, Infidel, op. cit., p. 215. 
81 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 220. 
82 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 108. 
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Islamic debating group in a local neighbourhood centre in Nairobi that Hirsi Ali 
joins in her late teens. The group consists mostly of highly educated urban 
Pakistani and Somalian youth, dressed in western clothing. They were 
‘dissatisfied with the intellectual level of the teaching at the madrassahs’, and 
Hirsi Ali portrays them as ‘very bright, deeply committed older students’.83 
Whereas in the mosque, sermons were often just a recitation of old texts in 
Arabic, here the debates were in English, they ‘were lively, and often clever, as 
well as much more relevant to our lives than the mosque’.84 An image that raises 
questions about Hirsi Ali’s earlier claim that Muslims are not allowed to debate 
their religion. It corresponds with how Roy describes the religious revival in the 
seventies and eighties, the emergence of which is a consequence of the 
disembedding of Islam from the local, traditional culture.85 Hirsi Ali writes 
disparagingly of the local Islamic traditions of believers who ‘interlaced their 
Quran with tribal customs’ and points to the ‘universal character’ of the 
Brotherhood: ‘In contrast to the clan warfare of Somalia, the Brotherhood 
seemed to have a more universal character because it included people of every 
clan.’86 Here the Brotherhood’s Islamism seems to work against the very clan 
culture that Hirsi Ali has argued to be quintessential to Islam. It is in line with 
Roy’s argument, that Islamist radicals are westernized youth who now see the 
Islam as a universal and global phenomenon, decoupled from local traditions. 
                                                        
83 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 108. 
84 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 108. 
85 Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, op. cit., p. vi. 
86 Hirsi Ali, Infidel, op. cit., p. 136. 
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The loss of cultural identity – ‘the old Islam my grandmother believed in’, in the 
words of Hirsi Ali – is the condition for the rise of new forms of fundamentalism.  
The modern aspects – on an intellectual level – of the Islamism of Sayyid Qutb 
and the Moslim Brotherhood are also present in the writing of Ayaan Hirsi Ali. 
There is the dismissal of the authority of the mosques and existing Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh), described as ‘old sermons written by long-dead scholars’. 
There is the aversion to Arabic and the idea of studying the Koran independently 
in modern languages: ‘I bought my own English edition of the Quran and read it 
so I could understand it better.’87 There is the notion of ‘a catastrophic 
revolution’, alien to the Islamic tradition, and closer to Lenin than Mohammed. 
There is the ideal of Islam as a universal government, to be realised not by God, 
but by the movement itself: ‘Our goal was a global Islamic government, for 
everyone’.88 There is the idea of a revolutionary vanguard, which we see 
expressed in terms like ‘small groups of true believers’ and ‘God’s shock troops’, 
and finally there’s the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ Muslims and the 
‘true’ and ‘untrue’ faith, when she describes their intention ‘to awaken passive 
Muslims to the call of the true, pure belief’.89  
 
At the same time, Hirsi Ali stays true to the theme of the return to the source, the 
notion of a pure Islam. In her autobiography, Sister Aziza tells the teenager Hirsi 
Ali that it is ‘not permitted for one second to imagine that perhaps the Quran’s 
                                                        
87 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 104. 
88 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 109 
89 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 109 
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words could be adapted to a modern era. The Quran had been written by God, 
not by men.’90 Surprisingly, Hirsi Ali seems to agree with this statement. At times, 
a more sceptical tone is present in the text. When Hirsi Ali for example writes 
how ‘the Muslim Brotherhood believed that there was a pure, original Islam to 
which we all should return’.91 Or when she describes how ‘the Islam that we 
were imbibing stemmed from the hard, essentialist beliefs of thinkers seeking to 
revive the original Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and His disciples in the 
seventh century.’92 Her scepticism is even more explicit in The Caged Virgin, 
where she writes of ‘a return to a largely imaginary past as occurred in the 
Iranian Revolution and in other fundamentalist movements and regimes in 
Muslim countries.’93 In these passages, Hirsi Ali seems to be conscious of the fact 
that the appeal to a return to a true, pure Islam, needs be taken with a few grains 
of salt.  
Nothing of that scepticism remains, however, when Ayaan Hirsi Ali writes about 
her response to 9/11 in a later chapter of Infidel. It is the assault on the Twin 
Towers, we learn, that gave the decisive impetus for her break with her belief. 
The attacks on the World Trade Center take place in the period that Hirsi Ali 
worked at the Wiarda Beckman Foundation, the thinktank of the Dutch social 
democrat party (PvdA). She recounts how she exits the train, on the morning of 
the attacks, heading for the office. En route, she encounters Ruud Koole, then 
party chairman, who asks her why everybody seems to connect Islam with the 
                                                        
90 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 105. 
91 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 105. 
92 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 108. 
93 Hirsi Ali, The Caged Virgin, op. cit., p. 51. 
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attacks, when it is nothing but a ‘lunatic fringe’.94 Ayaan Hirsi Ali answers: ‘This 
is Islam’ and recounts her thoughts, walking into the office as having ‘to wake 
these people up’. 95 When she describes the letter from Mohammed Atta with the 
instructions to the hijackers, how they are to die as good Muslims, she recognises 
it as originating in the fundamentalist movement she herself had been part of. 
She concludes: ‘This was not just Islam, this was the core of Islam.’96  
Hirsi Ali ties the attacks to fundamentalist Islam, and proceeds to present that as 
‘genuine’ Islam: ‘Every devout Muslim who aspired to practice genuine Islam — 
the Muslim Brotherhood Islam, the Islam of the Medina Quran schools — even if 
they didn’t actively support the attacks, they must at least have approved of 
them.’97 The former is not only untrue, for someone like Hirsi Ali, familiar with 
the Muslim Brotherhood, it should be easy to corroborate.  
Then Hirsi Ali goes even further: it is scripture and not Bin Laden that is 
responsible for the attacks: ‘The Prophet Muhammad was the moral guide, not 
Bin Laden, and it was the Prophet’s guidance that should be evaluated.’98 In her 
biography she seems convinced that quotations from the Koran can be taken 
literally: ‘All these statements that Bin Laden and his people quote from the 
Quran to justify the attacks — I looked them up; they are there. If the Quran is 
timeless, then it applies to every Muslim today.’99 ‘Did the 9/11 attacks stem 
                                                        
94 Hirsi Ali, Infidel, op cit., p. 268. 
95 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 268. 
96 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 269. 
97 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 270. 
98 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 271 
99 Hirsi Ali, Infidel, op. cit., p. 273. 
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from true belief in true Islam?’, Hirsi Ali asks rhetorically.100 The answer is 
clearly confirmative. In other parts of her writing, however, she criticizes the 
people who ‘interpret the holy texts’ in a ‘literal vein’, blaming the amount of 
Islamic ‘word-nazis’ for the sad state of women in Islam,101 and associating the 
literalist reading with fundamentalist Islam.102  
The recurring essentialist qualifications in the passages above and in the 
biography of Ayaan Hirsi Ali – true Islam, the core of Islam, pure Islam, genuine 
Islam, timeless Islam, the source of the Islam, the essence of Islam, the real Islam 
– are deeply significant. Take the following passage:  
‘I first encountered the full strength of Islam as a young child in Saudi 
Arabia. It was very different from the diluted religion of my 
grandmother, which was mixed with magical practices and pre-
Islamic beliefs. Saudi Arabia is the source of Islam and its quintessence. 
It is the place where the Muslim religion is practiced in its purest 
form, and it is the origin of much of the fundamentalist vision that has, 
in my lifetime, spread far beyond its borders.’103  
Hirsi Ali is aware that these fundamentalist views originate from the Sahwa 
mentioned before, the religious revival in the seventies and eighties that she 
became part of, stemming from a combination of Islamism and Wahhabism. She 
presents the fundamentalist perspective as the timeless essence of the entire 
                                                        
100 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 271 
101 Hirsi Ali, The Caged Virgin, op. cit., p. 160. 
102 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 171 
103 Hirsi Ali, Infidel, op. cit., pp. 675-676. 
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Islamic religion. Here it is useful to return to Olivier Roy’s remark that Islamic 
fundamentalism is a movement that denies its own historicity. Hirsi Ali uses that 
myth of timelessness as a weapon against her former religion.  
‘But I could no longer avoid seeing the totalitarianism, the pure moral 
framework that is Islam. It regulates every detail of life and 
subjugates free will. True Islam, as a rigid belief system and a moral 
framework, leads to cruelty. The inhuman act of those nineteen 
hijackers was the logical outcome of this detailed system for 
regulating human behavior. Their world is divided between ‘Us’ and 
‘Them’ — if you don’t accept Islam you should perish.’104  
Following in the footsteps of Bernard Lewis, by describing the friend-enemy 
logic employed by jihadists, and by subsequently equating Islamic jihadism with 
scripture as such, Hirsi Ali makes the whole of Islam into an enemy that needs to 
be vanquished. ‘The greatest advantage of Huntington’s civilizational model of 
international relations is that it reflects the world as it is – not as we wish it to 
be’, Hirsi Ali wrote in 2010 in an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal.105 ‘It 
allows us to distinguish friends from enemies’, she added, closely mirroring the 
worldview of the 9/11 hijackers she had described in Infidel.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Hirsi Ali has described her life as a journey along the clash of civilizations. That 
journey is both physical and intellectual. There is a dramatized, staged quality to 
                                                        
104 Hirsi Ali, ibid., p. 272. 
105 A. Hirsi Ali, ‘How to Win the Clash of Civilizations’, The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2010. 
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her life story, presented to us in stark contrasts between the modern, 
enlightened West and traditional, backward Islam. Her perspective on Islam 
rests on views adopted from the tradition of Western Orientalism, which leads to 
contradictions with her own life story as recounted in Infidel. The profound 
similarities between the Western Orientalist and the Islamic fundamentalist 
perspective on Islam, has allowed her to present the latter as the validation of 
the former. Using the work of scholars such as Olivier Roy allows us to extract a 
markedly different perspective from Hirsi Ali’s biography, in which the 
modernity Islam supposedly lacks, is exactly the precondition for the rise of 
fundamentalist movements. Finally, Hirsi Ali’s politics are shaped by the 
concerns of neoconservatism, and her writing can be seen as a biographical 
variant of Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory, relying on a Schmittian 
friend-enemy distinction. Since Hirsi Ali’s work is predicated on a necessarily 
hostile - and incompatible - relation between the West and Islam, she has little to 
offer in terms of solutions.  
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